same time, both horizontal and vertical accountability can be limited or even inefficient.
It happens -sometimes deliberately and entirely for convenience depending on the enforcer -with the development of less risky and less costly horizontal checks and balances systems in order to attend different demands and pressures.
In other words, anti-corruption mechanisms can be conveniently designed and enforced to fit different kinds of demands from both those who want and do not want greater accountability. The concept of rationality implies, to some extent, conscious reactions not only to commit a criminal or corrupt act but to also prevent it. The main argument of this paper is that when calculating costs and benefits, enforcers might often choose the 'convenient accountability' to keep a certain balance to abstain from 'whatever it costs' behaviour, which is potentially damaging for politicians in office.
In the first section of this paper, the process to design and put into force the new piece of legislation against international and domestic bribery that took around 15 years to establish in Brazil will be presented. This process culminated in the publication of enforcement guidelines in March 2015 and in the issue of the provisional Executive
Order No. 703 1 in December 2015 reviewing some important topics, especially to attend part of the demand coming from the prosecutor service and the account court as well as corporations.
The role of external drivers within this process, such as people on the streets in massive anti-corruption demonstrations, the media covering a different range of corruption scandals as well as the major government contractors and campaign donors who can be potential targets of this Law acting on the backstage will also be explored.
The second section briefly compares the Brazilian Act with the main provisions of the UK Bribery Act and the US FCPA (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) as well as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) main guidelines in order to answer whether Brazil follows international patterns. Finally, and before final thoughts on how Brazil could better enforce its anti-corruption law, it will be discussed whether there is enough evidence to suggest that the concept of 'convenient accountability' fits to explain this process as well as to put the Brazilian CCA into practice.
Few scholars from Political and Social Sciences have written about this new
legislation, which has left the most robust analysis until now to practitioners, especially those in the field of Law who have been discussing the concept of automatic and objective responsibility (Magalhães 2013; Bottini and Tamasauskas 2014; Nascimento 2014) , or those comparing the main points of the Brazilian CCA with the UK Bribery Act as well as the US FCPA or even the OECD Convention (Levine et al 2013; Zaheer 2014 ).
This paper may fill in this gap not only by pointing out the major provisions and achievements of this new Brazilian Law but also by shedding light onto the importance and nuances of its process through the eyes of Political and Social Sciences.
In sum, this paper shows that the way anti-corruption laws are designed and put into force might affect their enforcement, especially in countries such as Brazil where 'convenient accountability' applies in certain circumstances; or, in other words, where political will is affected by the inevitable pressure of those who do not want greater control mechanisms. Hence, understanding how accountability is imposed could be very useful in the process of enhancing accountability.
Step by step: Being pushed by external drivers
The backbone of the process of creating and putting the Brazilian CCA into force can be compared to one of the laws of motion, more precisely to Newton's Third Law: 'For every action there must be an equal and opposite reaction' (Newton 1999:19) . The Brazilian legislators were, to some extent, pushed forwards and backwards during the whole process. The 'anti-corruption law' timeline therefore helps to visualize this tension among different kinds of demands provoking action-reaction behaviour from 2000 until now.
Although it took 15 years for Brazil to design, enact and put into effect its antiinternational bribery law, there is evidence that every single step forward within this process was pushed by a strong claim from the international anti-corruption organizations as much as the national civil society and, sometimes, even by specific corruption scandals intensively covered by the national media. At the same time, the apparent lack of rush in improving this piece of anti-corruption legislation may be connected to the demands from those who do not want greater accountability, especially the potential targets of this Law -companies who are massive campaign financers and governmental contractors.
In 2000, Brazil signed the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, which was enacted three years before. Even as one of the non-OECD members, Brazil committed to ensuring that its national parliament approve the Convention and pass legislation necessary for its ratification and implementation into national law. For almost ten years, however, nothing in this direction has been made and the OECD had criticized Brazil for not holding corporate entities liable for corrupt conduct. After the UK Anti Bribery Act (2010), Brazil lost its excuse that even developed countries had not passed a similar statute.
Before designing its CCA, it is important to point out that Brazil first included new provisions on its Penal Code to punish private parties in cases of crimes against public administration as well as changed some points of a specific law against money laundering. Notwithstanding, it was not considered enough by the international anticorruption community. It was only in February 2010, under intense international pressures (Nascimento 2014) , mainly from the OECD, that the Federal Executive branch finally sent its first version of the CCA to be analysed and voted by its National Congress 2 . Among the reasons listed in the statement that was sent to the Congress, the federal Execute highlighted not only the gap in the Brazilian legislation to punish companies involved in international corruption cases but also the necessity to cooperate Congress stressing that such a piece of legislation be considered 'urgent'. The heads of the Comptroller General Office and the Federal Government Attorney General's Office as well as the minister of Justice claimed that civil and administrative punishments were better than criminal ones in the case of corporations because they are faster and more 2 In Brazil, the Congress has a Chamber of Deputies (lower house with 513 members on four-year terms) and a Senate (upper house with 81 members on eight-year terms). Both houses have to approve the same bill text before it goes for the presidential enactment.
efficient. The bill, as well as this message, was sent to Congress eight months before the 2010 federal elections, when President Lula used his popularity to build up the former minister and, to some extent, the political novice, Dilma Rousseff, his successor. If the bill was approved on time, it would have been an important campaign flag for boosting Dilma's image. In addition, the bill arrived in Congress at the same moment Brazil was experiencing a massive corruption scandal. Hence, the decision to send the bill can be seen, in the very least, as good timing to address corruption with stronger measures.
At that time, the governor of the Distrito Federal had been accused of leading a scheme which consisted of overcharging contracts with private companies in order to inject money into political parties and politicians. Mr José Roberto Arruda was the only governor affiliated to DEM (an opposing party to the federal administration ran by President Lula) and the Federal Police arrested him three days after President Lula signed the bill. The case received national media attention because a whistle-blower had recorded videos of the exact moment the money was delivered to Arruda's hands as well as to the hands of local politicians, businessmen and journalists. Some of them were shown hiding the bribery in their underwear, socks and bags.
When the Federal Executive branch designed the anti-corruption law, however, the aim was not to react to this specific scandal, although the timing was convenient.
Lula's administration's main goal was using the company's assets as compensation for the damage caused by corrupt acts (Falcão 2010) . As the Comptroller General Office head chief stated at that time, it was the first time Brazil would have a piece of law to support seizing a certain company's revenue capital to seek compensation for the losses actually caused by corruption. In turn, the National Congress pushed a tenfold increase 
It is important to highlight that 2012 was the year of local elections in all of
Brazil's 5,567 municipalities 5 . Besides the fact that some members of Congress traditionally run for these elections, most of them have strong political links to municipalities in their home states. Candidates must be registered by July 2012 and only then official campaign financing can start for the October elections. In 2012, all candidates running for mayor and local council representatives received a total of $0.9bi (or 1,867,590,018.37 reais) donated by private companies, most of them traditional campaign financers. As Table 1 shows, the top 15 financers, ranked by the total amount donated, were responsible for 22.6% of all donations made by companies in the 2012 elections (Política Aberta 2013) to all candidates from all parties who ran for office that year. At least six of these companies are now being investigated in another massive corruption scandal in Brazil, as will be discussed. It was only in April 2013 that the bill started moving around again within Congress. At that time, the congressional member in charge of giving the final version of the bill formally admitted that companies were pushing for changes
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. In one of his reports,
Carlos Zarattini (Workers Party-São Paulo) stated that 'there was resistance from various business sectors' towards the new legal provision regarding joint liabilities. The current understanding is that the new legislation allows punishing not only the company that allegedly engaged in corruption but also parent, subsidiary, or affiliated companies that are part of a same group that benefited from the corrupt act, although the fine will be based on the gross revenues of the company to which the corrupt entity or subsidiary is directly linked, and not on the revenues of the group as a whole.
The bill was approved by the special commission and, at the beginning of June 2013, sent to a permanent commission in order to analyse whether it fit within the current Constitution of Brazil and finally, to transform it into Law, although there was no previous deadline defined for these steps.
In June 2013, however, Brazil saw massive street demonstrations across the country. Thousands of people in different cities protested for better services, new laws and less corruption in a movement that might be seen as both the expression of traditional middle class complaining with several aspects of national reality as well as of new proletariats who suffer from low pay, high turnover and poor working conditions (Singer 2013 Also, to respond to people's demands presented in the street demonstrations, President Dilma Rousseff enacted the bill on August 1st. She exercised her authority to veto barring three provisions (Zaheer 2014) . The major veto regards to the need to prove negligence or wilfully corrupt conduct. It deleted any fault or intent requirement from the Law for it to be enforced. Therefore, punishment would be applied based on evidence, facts and outcomes that any employee's act has somehow beneficiated the company as a consequence of a corrupt act. She also vetoed an item that limited the fine to the value of the contract between the company and the public agency and another item that took into consideration the extent to which a public official contributed to the illegal conduct to define the sanctions.
Despite the fact that the CCA was enacted in 2013, it was only put into force in January 2014 due the necessity to edit further guidelines. This time gap was used by the
Comptroller General Office to prepare internal regulations and rules such as how a procedure would be conduct or which kind of compliance mechanisms are mandatory in order to reduce sanctions. The guidelines were ready in January 2014 but the president of Brazil did not sign this regulation in 2014. Dilma Rousseff, who in 2014 was running for re-election, did not issue the decree in that year in order to avoid any doubts or courts disputes, even after a corruption investigation involving Petrobras, the biggest Brazilian state-controlled company, was opened.
In March 2014, Brazil saw the beginning of another huge corruption scandal being brought to public attention. Dubbed 'Car Wash' (Lava Jato in Portuguese), it is the bribery, kickback and federal public money laundering investigation resulting in a rare case of effective cooperation between the Federal Police, the Federal Prosecutor Service and the Federal Judiciary (De Figueiredo, 2015) . The scheme seems to be old-fashion as politicians and political parties made it an aim to appoint top Petrobras officials who colluded with a cartel of private companies to overcharge contracts for construction and service work. The cartel, known as 'the club' by its own members, not only decided which of its member companies would win a contract but also split part of the oily company's payments with its officials, Congress members and leaders of political parties. Part of the money received through the overcharged contracts also went direct to political campaigns as legal donations.
Lava-Jato main findings have been making newspaper headlines every single day and the scope of this investigation is still rapidly expanding. Throughout an 18-month span, it has already investigated Petrobras' contracts and it has sent more than thirty executives from Brazil's top construction firms as well as former or non-elected politicians and high rank former civil servants into police custody. In addition, 47 members of the National Congress are already being investigated by the Supreme Court, making the petrolão (the "big oily") Brazil's biggest corruption scandal to date (De The Judiciary in this Lava-Jato case is convicting and applying criminal sanctions against businessmen at a faster rate than the Federal Executive branch and its administrative fines against their companies, contrary to the main efficiency argument which sustains that the Brazilian Act should only adopt only civil sanctions against corrupt companies. Therefore, it remains the question whether the 'anti-corruption law' needs another external push to bring out the first charges and sanctions, especially against those who are already being investigated by other anti-corruption agencies.
Main provisions: Following international patterns except on enforcement
Fifteen years after signing the OECD Convention, Brazil is struggling to enforce a legal instrument that makes companies strictly liable for acts of corruption (both domestic and foreign) and bid-rigging practised by their employees and agents. Although the Brazilian Clean Company Act was designed based on the main provisions of the UK Bribery Act and the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the Brazilian text only provides strict civil and administrative penalties but no criminal sanctions for companies as the OECD suggests and as the other two acts do as well. Therefore, imprisonment as a penalty is not expected for Brazil even though it will be enforcing this specific legislation.
Nevertheless, a brief comparison among the main provisions of the Brazilian, the UK and the US acts shows a similar conclusion previously pointed out by Zaheer (2014) , who compared Law 12846/2013 with OECD Convention requirements. 'The Brazilian
Law either meets or exceeds' the core international patterns, 'except those on enforcement' (Zaheer 2014:18) . Unlike the US FCPA, Table 2 shows that both Brazilian and British acts do not punish private to private bribes. In addition, both Brazilian and British ones require no proof of top bosses' knowledge or the intent of any benefits achieved through an illegal act against the public administration committed by any employee, even through a subsidiary or a subcontractor. Unlike the UK Bribery Act, the Brazilian and the US acts do not criminalize the acceptance of a bribe, although Brazil has other laws that do it.
Moreover, both Brazilian and US ones take on the role of being both an investigator and prosecutor with one only agency. Table 2 also helps visualize who should enforce the acts in the three countries. In the case of Brazil, they are slightly different from the US and UK acts. To be the enforcer, the Comptroller General Office was chosen to coordinate and, in special occasions, to conduce administrative investigations in Brazil's federal sphere. The agency is also expected to conduce all the leniency agreements at federal levels as well as all the overseas cases.
In fact, in Brazil, even in the Federal sphere, the task to investigate companies for suspicious or corrupt acts within Brazilian territory is given to the Comptroller General, the Prosecutor Service and the Federal Government Attorney General Service and each one of the 39 ministries. The Comptroller General officers, however, cannot take cases to court. In order to ensure civil sanctions, such as dissolving a company or seizing revenue or property, it is expected that the Prosecutor Service, which is an external anticorruption agency, or the Federal Government Attorney Service representatives take the cases to court. However, it still remains unclear whether and how the administrative procedures will be shared with other law enforcement authorities (Zaheer 2014 ). In addition, according to the Act, any local authority in the 27 states as well as in the 5670 municipalities in Brazil can enforce the Act, although most of them have hardly any internal agencies prepared to enforce any anti-corruption laws. 
Created in 2001 and renamed in 2003 with additional tasks, the Comptroller
General Office is one of the Federal Executive branch internal control agencies. It carries out all the public audits, corruption prevention and ombudsman activities as well as being responsible for supervising all internal investigations against the government's civil servants. Before announcing his resignation in December 2014, the former minister (head of the agency) complained about budget cuts suggesting such cuts has made it harder for the agency to fulfil its anti-corruption mission. After the new task regarding the CCA, the anti-corruption agency suffered another cut that affected the federal administration as a whole. In the case of the anti-corruption agency, the cut per month is 1.89 million reais ($ 0.7 million).
On the other hand, in line with both acts as well as with OECD guidelines, the Brazilian act gives weight to generally effective compliance programmes in order to minimise sanctions. Unlike either, however, it exceeds the main international frameworks allowing courts to dissolve a company in particularly egregious cases and at the same time it does not include the prohibition to sign new contracts while a company is being investigated or offering a leniency agreement among its provisions (Magalhães 2013) .
Brazilian legislation also includes other serious and complex fraud issues other than bribery. Nevertheless, even inside the Comptroller General Office, there are still controversies around which act is punishable, considering that the five topics listed as offences on written Law can be considered imprecise. It is not clear, for instance, what will be considered 'undue pecuniary or other undue advantage' as it says Chapter 2 of the Brazilian CCA. In comparison, the US Act does not punish, for instance, facilitation payments and promotional expenses such as travel or accommodation costs, in contrary to the UK Act that consider them an offence.
Although there are some gaps or issues to be addressed, on paper the Brazilian CCA attends international demands without being a copy of international frameworks.
It was customised with its own peculiarities. However, it is not clear yet how it will be enforced, especially by state and municipalities agencies.
Convenient accountability: A reaction to intense pressure
Like any new legislation, there was not enough time for the courts to decide on the most controversial topics of the CCA. Further regulations and guidelines are also expected to be introduced. However, the long and slow process of preparing, designing and implementing guidelines around the Act can be seen as a clear sign that Brazil has made the obvious choice to not ignore civil society's claims and neither to rush and improve systems that could punish, for instance, the major campaign financers and contractors in the country. This apparent 'lack of rush' might be understood as an attempt to adopt the less controlled systems under the rulers perspective, at least in the short term.
There is a real concern inside the Federal government around the effects of applying a severe punishment, such as the dissolution of companies, as the outcome of any current enquires. It is important to note that will be punished only those acts of corruption committed after January 2014, when the CCA was officially put into force. As mentioned previously, the first targets of Law 12846/2013 are those who offered leniency agreements or are already being investigated and have a close relationship with high level politicians not only as traditional campaign financers but also because they are responsible for the biggest and most important infrastructure contracts in Brazil.
Therefore, the federal government cannot take any chance to be dysfunctional or to place an economy that has already been considered as disappointing in further risk (The
Economist 2015).
When governmental rulers take baby steps to design, approve, enforce and regulate a new legislation, they could be, to some extent, calculating all the risks to avoid less campaign donations and also massive unemployment and bankruptcy of major companies. At the same time, they are taking into account the necessity to take action against international constraints and pressure as well as to the peoples' claims for better anti-corruption mechanisms. It is, therefore, a convenient reaction that seems to be suitable and as comfortable as possible for those who are in power; it is a compressible movement to respond to different kind of pressures. This is labelled here as 'convenient accountability' and occurs when rulers or state agents do want to avoid disappointment among opposing interests and, therefore, take the most convenient measures for them. Indeed, it is a decision based on self-interest and is made in order to ensure power stability.
The suggestion that arises from this study is to apply a rationality perspective to both those who have criminal (or corrupt) behaviour and those supposed to enforce laws and follow internal rules. Gary Becker in his article 'Crime and Punishment: an economic approach ' (1968) suggests that crime can be seen as a choice based on costbenefit analysis in order to maximise profits and minimise losses (De Figueiredo 2012) .
In the case of the Brazilian CCA, this cost-benefit analysis can be identified in almost the whole process from the beginning. It important to note that in this specific case, the 'convenient accountability' concept applies to the attempt to find a balance between the expected improvement of Brazil's horizontal accountability and vertical accountability, especially because the accountable target states in the interface between the public and the private sectors. Moreover, when horizontal accountability targets private companies, as is the case of Law 12846/2013, it is more likely to expect the 'convenient accountability' due to the different kinds of pressure and interests handled by rulers who do want to remain in power and want to avoid frustrating the maximum number of direct and indirect supporters. It is essential to highlight that having a specific law does not mean less accountability or crime control, especially in countries like Brazil in which some laws are famous for not sticking. Correct enforcement followed by real sanctions may be considered indispensable. Therefore, more important than the rule of the law is the 'risk of apprehension, the seriousness of the expected punishment, the value of the criminal enterprise, and his or her immediate need for criminal gain' (Siegel 1992:131) . 'Hence, crime is more likely to be controlled if, for instance, more law enforcement and punishment is applied' (De Figueiredo 2012:15) .
On the other hand, it is possible to note that until now the main, visible and positive outcome of this new law came from some companies that are operating in order to improve or create compliance mechanisms (Bottini and Tamasauskas 2014) as a preventive act. Indeed, international and local companies are expected by the CCA to maintain not only adequate systems of internal controls but also to be ready to self-report corrupt practices in order to minimise sanctions in case they are caught.
As Nobrega (2014) points out, the new rules, if enforced, can be considered able to modify the behaviour of companies involved in corrupt practices. 'However, for effective change in behaviour, the perception that those rules are in fact being applied is necessary. Therefore, skilled civil servants as well as appropriate procedures and punishments along with low reversibility of administrative decisions in the judicial environment are elements to be sought by the government' (Nobrega 2014:71) .
Final thoughts
Until now, there have been no clear signs that would allow us to predict the real outcomes of the enforcement in the federal and (even less) in the local spheres. Future studies should look for evidence to show whether 'convenient accountability' could affect the decision of opening new enquiries and punishing companies as well as how long already opened procedures are taking to be completed. At the same time, whether another public street demonstration or any international embarrassment could force the Comptroller General Office to rush its internal investigation and announce sanctions in the near future remains a question which is open to debate.
Despite the apparent force of civil society in this case of 'pressure from below' driving every step of this legislation, no company has yet been punished under Law 12846/2013. The same 'lack of rush' to design and put this law into force can be seen during the guideline phase as well as during the initial enforcement phase along with the investigative enquires and leniency agreements being conducted slowly. This can be seen if compared with the outcomes of Lava Jato investigation conducted by the Federal Police, Prosecutor Service and the federal judiciary.
In addition, before concluding the ongoing investigations, however, the Federal Executive preferred to change the Law in order to attend some companies' demands, especially to allow them to sign contracts with the public service after signing leniency agreements. The provisional Executive Order 703/2015 has the full force of Law for 90 days and, then, it needs to be validated by the National Congress. There are already attempts to make amendments in order to directly connect the anti-corruption Law to other anti-corruption agencies in the Brazilian multi-institutional accountability system such as the prosecutor service and the account court (De Figueiredo 2016 ).
In conclusion, how anti-corruption laws are designed and put into force matters and affects their enforcement, especially in countries such as Brazil where political-will is affected by the inevitable pressure of those who do not want greater control mechanisms. Hence, Brazil's Clean Company Act can be considered nothing else but an example of 'convenient accountability'.
